Voto aprobatorio: Diferenzas entre revisións

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Liña 1:
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[[Imaxe:Approval ballot.svg|thumb|right|Nunhas eleccións con voto aprobatorio, o votante pode votar por calqueira número de candidatos.]]
 
O '''voto aprobatorio''' é un [[sistema de votación]] usado en [[eleccións]], onde cada votante pode votar por tantos candidatos como desexe. É normalmente usado en elección nas que só pode haber un gañador. Pode ser usado en eleccións de gañador múltiple tamén, porén, nesta versión ten propiedades matemáticas moi diferentes, como embaixo se indica. O voto aprobatorio é unha forma primitiva de [[voto valorativo]], onde as opcións do votante son extremadamente poucas: aceptar ou rexeitar. O voto aprobatorio evita a paradoxa presentada polo [[Teorema de imposibilidade de Arrow]] xa que non é un sistema de orde preferencial.
 
O método foi descrito nun ensaio de 1968 do astrónomo [[Guy Ottewll]] e publicado en 1977 baixo o nome de "The Arithmetic of Voting"<ref>http://www.universalworkshop.com/pages/ArithmeticOfVoting.htm </ref>. O termo "voto aprobatorio" foi acuñado por [[Robert J. Weber]] en 1976, mais foi totalmente desenvolvido en 1977 e publicado en 1978 polo politólogo [[Steven Brams]] e o matemático [[Peter Fishburn]]. Historicamente, algo semellante ó voto aprobatorio foi utilizado durante o século XIII na [[República de Venecia]] e nas eleccións parlamentarias da [[Inglaterra]] do século XIX. Ademais, as Nacións Unidas usan un proceso semellante para elixir ó seu Secretario Xeral. Aínda que proposto en países como os Estados Unidos, actualmente non é usado en ningunhas eleccións públicas.
 
 
==Procedemento==
 
Cada votante pode votar por tódalas opcións que queira, como máximo unha vez por opción. Isto ñe equivalente a dicir que cada votante pode "aprobar" ou "rexeitar" cada opción votando ou non por ela, e tamén é equivalente a dicir que é votar +1 ou 0 nun sistema de votación por rango. A opción con máis votos após o reconto gaña.
 
==Exemplo==
 
Imaxinemos que a poboación de [[Galiza]] vota a localización da súa capital. Para este exemplo, supoñamos que a poboación de Galiza está concentrada en catro cidades, sitas en todo o país, e que todo o electorado, que quere que a capital se estableza o máis preto posíbel da súa cidade, vive nestas catro.
 
Liña 63 ⟶ 57:
 
===Potencial para o voto táctico===
 
O voto aprobatorio pasa o [[criterio da monotonicidade]], no que a elección dun candidato nunca reduce as posibilidades de gañar dese candidato. Sen dúbida, nunca hai un motivo para o [[voto táctico]] polo candidato X sen votar por por tódolos candidatos que o votante prefira por riba do candidato de X. Tampouco é necesario votar por un candidato que lle guste menos ó votante que o candidato X para que X sexa elixido. Así, após que o votante decida a súa preferencia, só necesita decidir a cantos candidatos votará: en caso de ''n'' candidatos, vota a os seus ''k'' candidatos favoritos, onde 0 < ''k'' < ''n'', sendo ''k'' decidido previamente (''k'' =0 ou ''k''= ''n'' é inutil). Se o votante pensa que os dosu candidatos mais votados serán aqueles que estan nas posicións ''p'' e ''q'', que na súa lista de preferencias están situados ''p'' > ''q'', debe elixir ''k'' entre ''p'' e ''q'', por exemplo, votando por ''p'' e non por ''q''.
 
Liña 88 ⟶ 81:
* Santiago de Compostela: 43 votos
 
==Notas==
==Effect on elections==
<references />
The effect of this system as an [[electoral reform]] measure is not without critics. [[Instant-runoff voting]] advocates like the [[Center for Voting and Democracy]] argue that approval voting would lead to the election of "lowest common denominator" candidates disliked by few, and liked by few, but this could also be seen as an inherent strength against demagoguery in favor of a discreet popularity. A study by approval advocates [[Steven Brams]] and [[Dudley R. Herschbach]] published in ''[[Science (journal)|Science]]'' in 2001 <ref>Brams and Herschbach {{Cite journal|title=The Science of Elections|id={{Doi|10.1126/science.292.5521.1449}}|journal=Science|volume=292|issue=5521|pages=1449|year=2001}}</ref> argued that approval voting was "fairer" than [[Preferential voting|preference voting]] on a number of criteria. They claimed that a close analysis shows that the hesitation to support a lesser evil candidate to the same degree as one supports one's first choice actually outweighs the extra votes that such second choices get.
 
One study <ref>[http://ceco.polytechnique.fr/GENERALITE/resultats.pdf Results of experimental vote in France, 2002] ([[Portable Document Format|PDF]], [[French Language|French]])</ref> showed that approval voting would not have chosen the same two winners
as plurality voting (Chirac and Le Pen) in [[French presidential election, 2002|France's presidential election of 2002]] (first round) - it instead would have chosen Chirac and Jospin. This seems a more reasonable result since Le Pen was a radical who lost to Chirac by an enormous margin in the second round.
 
While approval voting in single-winner elections is immune to cloning, its misuse as a multi-member method with teaming of candidates can produce ties, called the [[Burr dilemma]]. "Problems of multicandidate races in U.S. presidential elections motivated the modern invention and advocacy of approval voting; but it has not previously been recognized that the first four presidential elections (1788–1800) were conducted using a variant of approval voting. That experiment ended disastrously in 1800 with the infamous Electoral College tie between Jefferson and Burr. The tie,..., resulted less from miscalculation than from a strategic tension built into approval voting, which forces two leaders appealing to the same voters to play a game of Chicken."<ref>http://www.journalofpolitics.org/files/69_1/Nagel.pdf The Burr Dilemma in Approval Voting</ref>
 
==Other issues and comparisons==
Advocates of approval voting often note that a single simple ballot can serve for single, multiple, or negative choices. It requires the voter to think carefully about whom or what they really accept, rather than trusting a system of tallying or compromising by formal ranking or counting. Compromises happen but they are explicit, and chosen by the voter, not by the ballot counting.
Some features of approval voting include:
* Unlike [[Condorcet method]], [[instant-runoff voting]], and other methods that require ranking candidates, approval voting does not require significant changes in ballot design, voting procedures or equipment, and it is easier for voters to use and understand. This reduces problems with mismarked ballots, disputed results and recounts.
* It provides less incentive for [[negative campaigning]] than many other systems, through the same incentive as [[instant runoff voting]], [[Condorcet method]], and [[Borda count]].
* It allows voters to express tolerances but not preferences. Some political scientists consider this a major advantage, especially where acceptable choices are more important than popular choices.
* Each voter may vote as many times as wished, at most once per candidate. This is equivalent to saying that each voter may ''approve'' or ''disapprove'' each candidate by voting or not voting for them, and it is also equivalent to voting +1 or 0 in a [[range voting]] system.
* It is easily reversed as [[disapproval voting]] where a choice is disavowed, as is already required in other measures in politics (e.g. representative [[recall election|recall]]).
* In contentious elections with a super-majority of voters who prefer their favorite candidate vastly over all others, approval voting tends to revert to [[plurality voting]]. Some voters will support only their single favored candidate when they perceive the other candidates to be poor compromises.
* Approval voting fails the [[majority criterion]], because more than one person can win a majority of approval. (This requires that a larger majority also approve of the winner.)
 
===Multiple winners===
Approval voting can be extended to multiple winner elections. The naive way to do so is as ''block approval voting'', a simple variant on [[block voting]] where each voter can select an unlimited number of candidates and the candidates with the most approval votes win. This does not provide [[proportional representation]] and is subject to the [[Burr dilemma]], among other problems. It has also been extended as ''[[proportional approval voting]]'' which seeks to maximise the overall satisfaction with the final result using approval voting. That first system has been called minisum to distinguish it from minimax, a system which uses approval ballots and aims to elect the slate of candidates that differs from the least-satisfied voter's ballot as little as possible.
 
====Approval polling====
Approval voting can also be used to voting or polling questions which allow a variable number of winners.
 
A clear example is the question of candidate inclusion for debates. An approval poll would be better to ask: "Which candidates do you want to see in the debate?" rather than the usual polling question: "Who would you vote for if the election was today?"
 
In such a poll, a fixed threshold for inclusion could be made. For example, a debate could include all candidates above 15% approval support. Special rules would be needed to guarantee at least 2 candidates passing, possibly simply including all of candidates.
 
The advantage of '''approval polling''' is that voter have no fear that "overvoting" will hurt their higher choices. Undecided voters will tend to want to hear from more candidates early in the campaign, and will tend to reduce their preferences as voting day approaches.
 
===Relation to effectiveness of choices===
[[Operations research]] has shown that the effectiveness of a policy and thereby a leader who sets several policies will be [[Logistic function|sigmoidally]] related to the level of approval associated with that policy or leader.{{Fact|date=February 2007}} There is an acceptance level below which effectiveness is very low and above which it is very high. More than one candidate may be in the effective region, or all candidates may be in the ineffective region. Approval voting attempts to ensure that the most-approved candidate is selected, maximizing the chance that the resulting policies will be effective.
 
==Ballot types==
Approval ballots can be of at least four semi-distinct forms. The simplest form is a blank ballot where the names of supported candidates is written in by hand. A more structured ballot will list all the candidates and allow a mark or word to be made by each supported candidate. A more explicit structured ballot can list the candidates and give two choices by each. (Candidate list ballots can include spaces for write-in candidates as well.)
{| BORDER
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| [[Imaxe:Approvalballotname.png|160px]]
| [[Imaxe:Approvalballotword.png|160px]]
| [[Imaxe:Approvalballotmark.png|160px]]
| [[Imaxe:Approvalballotchoice.png|160px]]
|}
 
All four ballots are interchangeable. The more structured ballots may aid voters in offering clear votes so they explicitly know all their choices. The Yes/No format can help to detect an "undervote" when a candidate is left unmarked and allow the voter a second chance to confirm the ballot markings are correct.
 
==Vexa tamén==
{{Portal|Politics}}
* [[Borda count]]
* [[Bucklin voting]]
* [[First Past the Post electoral system]] (also called Plurality or Relative Majority)
* [[Condorcet method]]
* [[Schulze method]]
* [[Instant-runoff voting]]
* [[Majority Choice Approval]]
* [[Range voting]]
* [[Voting system]] - many other ways of voting
 
==Referencias==
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<references/>
 
==Ligazóns externas==
 
==VexaVéxase tamén==
===Ligazóns externas===
* [http://approvalvoting.org/ Citizens for Approval Voting]
* [http://approvalvoting.com/ Americans for Approval Voting]