Voto aprobatorio: Diferenzas entre revisións

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[[Imaxe:Approval ballot.svg|thumb|right|Nunhas eleccións con voto aprobatorio, o votante pode votar por calqueira número de candidatos.]]
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==Effect on elections==
The effect of this system as an [[electoral reform]] measure is not without critics. [[Instant-runoff voting]] advocates like the [[Center for Voting and Democracy]] argue that approval voting would lead to the election of "lowest common denominator" candidates disliked by few, and liked by few, but this could also be seen as an inherent strength against demagoguery in favor of a discreet popularity. A study by approval advocates [[Steven Brams]] and [[Dudley R. Herschbach]] published in ''[[Science (journal)|Science]]'' in 2001 <ref>Brams and Herschbach {{citeCite journal|title=The Science of Elections|id={{doiDoi|10.1126/science.292.5521.1449}}|journal=Science|volume=292|issue=5521|pages=1449|year=2001}}</ref> argued that approval voting was "fairer" than [[Preferential voting|preference voting]] on a number of criteria. They claimed that a close analysis shows that the hesitation to support a lesser evil candidate to the same degree as one supports one's first choice actually outweighs the extra votes that such second choices get.
 
One study <ref>[http://ceco.polytechnique.fr/GENERALITE/resultats.pdf Results of experimental vote in France, 2002] ([[Portable Document Format|PDF]], [[French Language|French]])</ref> showed that approval voting would not have chosen the same two winners
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==Vexa tamén==
{{portalPortal|Politics}}
* [[Borda count]]
* [[Bucklin voting]]