Voto aprobatorio: Diferenzas entre revisións

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Liña 62:
Santiago de Compostela seguiría a se-la capital de Galiza por voto aprobatorio.
 
===Potencial para o voto táctico===
 
ApprovalO votingvoto passesaprobatorio thepasa o [[monotonicitycriterio da criterionmonotonicidade]], inno thatque votinga forelección adun candidatecandidato nevernunca lowersreduce thatas candidate'sposibilidades chancede ofgañar winningdese candidato. IndeedSen dúbida, therenunca ishai neverun amotivo reasonpara for a voter too [[tacticalvoto voting|tactically votetáctico]] forpolo a candidatecandidato X withoutsen votingvotar forpor allpor candidatestódolos hecandidatos orque sheo prefersvotante toprefira candidatepor riba do candidato de X. ItTampouco isé alsonecesario nevervotar necessarypor forun acandidato voterque tolle votegustemenos foró avotante candidateque likedo ''less'' thancandidato X inpara orderque toX electsexa Xelixido. Thus, after a voter has decided on his preferences, he only needs to decide on how many candidates he will vote: in the case of ''n'' candidates he votes on his ''k'' most favorite candidates, where ''k'' with 0 < ''k'' < ''n'' has to be decided upon (''k'' = 0 or ''n'' is useless anyway). If the voter thinks that the two candidates with the most votes are those which are on positions ''p'' and ''q'' on his list of decreasing preference, with ''p'' < ''q'', he should choose ''k'' between ''p'' and ''q'', i.e., vote for ''p'' but not for ''q''.
===Potential for tactical voting===
Approval voting passes the [[monotonicity criterion]], in that voting for a candidate never lowers that candidate's chance of winning. Indeed, there is never a reason for a voter to [[tactical voting|tactically vote]] for a candidate X without voting for all candidates he or she prefers to candidate X. It is also never necessary for a voter to vote for a candidate liked ''less'' than X in order to elect X. Thus, after a voter has decided on his preferences, he only needs to decide on how many candidates he will vote: in the case of ''n'' candidates he votes on his ''k'' most favorite candidates, where ''k'' with 0 < ''k'' < ''n'' has to be decided upon (''k'' = 0 or ''n'' is useless anyway). If the voter thinks that the two candidates with the most votes are those which are on positions ''p'' and ''q'' on his list of decreasing preference, with ''p'' < ''q'', he should choose ''k'' between ''p'' and ''q'', i.e., vote for ''p'' but not for ''q''.
 
As approval voting does not offer a single method of expressing sincere preferences, but rather a plethora of them, voters are encouraged to analyze their fellow voters' preferences and use that information to decide which candidates to vote for. This feature of approval voting makes it difficult for theoreticians to predict how approval will play out in practice.